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BENEFIT CORPORATIONS-A SUSTAINABLE
FORM OF ORGANIZATION?
Dana Brakman Reiser*
INTRODUCTION
Founders of social enterprises believe profits and social good can
be produced in tandem and wish to form organizations that will
pursue these dual missions.' They will, however, encounter
obstacles to articulating and enforcing such dual missions if they
adopt either a traditional nonprofit or for-profit form of
organization. Nonprofit forms bar profit distribution2 and for-profit
forms will create practical, if not legal, pressure to favor profit
maximization over social good when the two come into conflict.3
And these two imperatives will certainly, at times, conflict. If more
profit could always be obtained by pursuing social good, traditional
for-profits would produce the optimal level of social goods, charities
would be swimming in resources, or both. Social entrepreneurs
believe social good can be produced along with profits and desire
hybrid forms of organization to smooth a single enterprise's path to
realizing both goals.4
A mounting number of jurisdictions have attempted to meet this
demand by enabling new hybrid organizational forms. These
include the low-profit limited liability company ("L3C") available in
nine U.S. states5 and the community interest company ("CIC")
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I greatly appreciate the
support of Brooklyn Law School's summer research stipend program, the
research assistance of Priti Trivedi, and the comments and suggestions of
Claire Kelly, Melanie Leslie, Antony Page, and the panelists and participants at
the Wake Forest Law School's Symposium, "The Sustainable Corporation" and
the "L3C A to Z" Conference. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.
1. See Robert Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L.
REV. 59, 86-93 (2010); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social
Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 338-342 (2009).
2. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J.
835, 838 (1980).
3. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 736-38 (2005) (arguing the view that corporate
managers must only pursue profit maximization is widely held, though not
strongly supported).
4. See Kelley, supra note 1, at 339.
5. See 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 67 (authorizing L3Cs in Rhode Island);
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available in the United Kingdom. 6 In addition, "B Corp" is a private
certification available to U.S. for-profits that demonstrate their
commitment to a dual mission of making profits and promoting
social good.7 Qualifying entities can license the B Corp mark to
market themselves to consumers, investors, and others. This Article
examines another recent entrant into the hybrid form category: the
benefit corporation. A handful of states have enacted statutes
enabling "benefit corporations" in the past two years, and several
more are considering similar legislation.8 The benefit corporation
form differs from the L3C, CIC, and B Corp in several respects,
especially in its use of third-party standard-setting organizations to
vet the social good bona fides of potential incorporators. 9 This
Article evaluates whether the innovations in the benefit corporation
form can meet the goals social entrepreneurs have for hybrid
organizational forms, ultimately concluding it will fall short.
This Article proceeds in two parts. The first Part explores the
new benefit corporation form. After briefly summarizing the key
elements of the L3C, CIC, and B Corp for purposes of comparison, it
describes the major components of the benefit corporation form. The
second Part then undertakes an admittedly preliminary assessment
of the benefit corporation. This Part offers four reasons why social
entrepreneurs view hybrid organizational forms attractive:
articulating and enforcing a dual mission, expanding funding
streams, branding their enterprises, and achieving sustainability.
The new benefit corporation form offers potential gains in formally
articulating a dual mission, an advantage as compared with
traditional nonprofit and for-profit forms. However, like the other
Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont's Social Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations and
Questions to Ponder, 35 VT. L. REV. 163, 170 (2010); Carter G. Bishop, Fifty
State Series: L3C and B Corporation Legislation Table (Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Research Paper 10-11, May 26, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1561783; see also Legislative Watch, AMERICANS FOR
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org
/legislativewatch.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2011) (providing updated counts of
states adopting and considering L3C legislation). Bills authorizing the L3C
structure have also been introduced in a great many additional states. See
Bishop, supra note 5; Schmidt, supra note 5, at 170; Legislative Watch, supra
note 5.
6. See Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act
2004, c. 27, Part 2, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/27
/pdfs/ukpga_20040027_en.pdf.
7. See B Lab, About Certified B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.netlabout (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
8. See Bishop, supra note 5; B Lab, Benefit Corporation Legislation,
CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/publicpolicy (last visited Aug.
28, 2011) (providing updated counts of states adopting and considering benefit
corporation legislation).
9. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CORPS & AsS'NS § 5-6C-01(e) (LexisNexis 2011)
(defining the role of third-party standard-setters); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.03(a)(8) (2011) (similar).
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hybrid forms simultaneously under development, the benefit
corporation lacks robust mechanisms to enforce dual mission, which
will ultimately undermine its ability to expand funding streams and
create a strong brand for social enterprise as sustainable
organizations.
I. THE BENEFIT CORPORATION
Before delving into the details of the new benefit corporation
form, it is useful to describe the dynamic scene onto which it enters.
When social entrepreneurs' frustration with traditional nonprofit
and for-profit forms became apparent, jurisdictions began to respond
with new hybrid forms. An early mover here was the United
Kingdom, which established the CIC in 2004.10 The CIC is a
company formed for community benefit purposes, which may offer
investors limited dividends, but must lock its assets and earnings
beyond these limited disbursements into the community benefit
stream."
Innovation began stateside with the L3C, first adopted by
statute in Vermont in 2008.12 Eight other states have since enacted
similar legislation.13 The L3C is a limited liability company formed
to "significantly further the accomplishment of one or more
charitable or educational purposes" and for whom neither income
production nor property appreciation may be a significant purpose.14
An L3C may have investor members who can receive unlimited
disbursements during the L3C's existence or upon dissolution, and if
the L3C ceases to pursue its educational and charitable purposes it
10. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended
Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 630 & n.74 (2010). Other examples from
abroad also exist, but will not be discussed here. See, e.g., Matthew F.
Doeringer, Note, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International
Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 291, 308-09 (2010) (describing, inter alia,
Belgium's Socidt6 A Finalit6 Sociale).
11. See CIC Regulator, CIC Guidance Chapter 1: Introduction, OFFICE OF
THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, 12-14, available at
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bispartners/cicregulator/docs/guidance/1 1-950-com
munity-interest-companies-guidance-chapter- 1-introduction.pdf.
12. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2011).
13. See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 163, 170; Legislative Watch, supra note 5.
Boosters of an L3C model for the United Kingdom have also proposed adoption
of a similar form there, dubbed the social enterprise limited liability
partnership ("SELLP"). See Claudia Cahalane, What Is the Perfect Legal
Structure for a Community Interest Company?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/social-enterprise-network/2011/apr/04/legal-structur
e-community-interest-company; Stephen Lloyd, The Social Enterprise LLP -
What Is It; And What Is It For?, THE BARRISTER,
http://www.barristermagazine.com/article-listing/current-issue/the-social-enterp
rise-llp-%E2%80%93-what-is-it;-and-what-is-it-for.html (last visited Aug. 28,
2011).
14. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2011).
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transforms into an ordinary LLC.15
In addition, companies have been able to obtain private
certification as a "B Corps" since 2006.16 B Corps must provide in
their formative documents that fiduciaries must consider the impact
of their decisions on various nonshareholder constituencies,
including the environment and the local, state, and national
economy.'7 A private nonprofit organization, B Lab, vets aspiring B
Corps to confirm that these governance structures have been
established and conducts an extensive survey to determine how well
an applicant uses "the power of business to solve social and
environmental problems."'8  Those applicants meeting B Lab's
standards may license the B Corp mark and are subject to audit by
B Lab on an ongoing basis.19 B Lab, of course, cannot confer a legal
form on an organization. By varying governance structures and
conveying information about conforming entities, however, B Corp
status appeals to social enterprises in a manner similar to official
hybrid forms.
In 2010, Maryland became the first state to establish a "benefit
corporation" form of organization, the subject of this Article. 20 This
new form blends both state enabling legislation and a third-party
certification system. Vermont, New Jersey, Virginia, and Hawaii
have since followed suit21 and benefit corporation legislation has
also been introduced in numerous other states.22  Although
15. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 10, at 650.
16. See B Lab, About Certified B Corps, supra note 7; see also David
Adelman, Understanding B Corporations, GREENBERG & BASS LLP (Aug. 6,
2010), http://greenbass.com/news/understanding-b-corporations/ (describing the
establishment and history of B Corps).
17. See B Lab, Legal Framework, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.netfbecomellegal (last visited Aug 28, 2011).
18. See B Lab, Why B Corps Matter, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/why (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
19. See B Lab, Who Certifies? CERTIFIED B. CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/index.cfm/fuseaction/content.page/nodelD/08c9dc4
d-6064-48cb-afO4-4fd9d4ced055/externalURL/ (click on "How do we Certify and
Audit companies as B Corporations?") (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
20. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns §§ 5-6C-01 to -08 (LexisNexis
2011); see also John Tozzi, Maryland Passes 'Benefit Corp.' Law for Social
Entrepreneurs, BLOOMBERG Bus. WK. (Apr. 13, 2010),
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/runningsmallbusiness/archives/2010/0
4/benefit-corp_bi.html; B Lab, Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit
Corporation Legislation, CSRWIRE (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.csrwire.com
/pressreleases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-
Corporation-Legislation.
21. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 to -11 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11A, § 21 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 to -791 (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg.
26th Sess. (Haw. 2011). The Hawaii legislation dubs its form a "sustainable
business corporation," but it is otherwise aligned with the other benefit
corporation enactments. S.B. 298, 2011 Leg. 26th Sess. § 2 (Haw. 2011).
22. See B Lab, Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 8; BusinessWire,
Gov. Christie Signs Benefit Corporation Legislation (Mar. 7, 2011),
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Maryland was the first mover here and all enacted and pending
statutes share many attributes, future references to the statutes
will highlight important points of divergence.
A. Separate Statute
The benefit corporation concept has thus far been enacted only
under special statutory authorization, separate and apart from the
adopting jurisdiction's standard corporate legislation. States could
have, alternatively, inserted provisions to allow the articulation or
preference of social goals into their existing corporation laws as an
opt-in provision.23  Yet, all of the benefit corporation statutes
envision a form of organization that is distinct from the standard
corporate form.24 Perhaps proceeding with a special statute eases
legislative adoption, but the special statute approach also ties in
with the statutes' recurring theme of avoiding infiltration of general
corporation law by benefit corporation norms. Yet, this walling-off
does not go both ways. When benefit corporation statutes are silent,
http://www.businesswire.comnews/home/20110307006758/en/Gov.-Christie-Sig
ns-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation (discussing the passage of New Jersey's
legislation and stating that New York, North Carolina, California,
Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Hawaii are introducing and moving similar
legislation).
Legislation to permit a different kind of incorporated hybrid, the "flexible
purpose corporation," has been introduced in California. A flexible purpose
corporation would pursue profit and at least one charitable purpose or a
purpose to pursue the interests of employees, suppliers, customers, creditors,
community, society or the environment. See S.B. 201, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2011) (proposing a change to CAL. CORP. CODE § 2302(b)(2) (2011)).
These purposes would be disclosed to the secretary of state, but not vetted by a
third party as benefit corporation statutes contemplate. See id. See also
Jonathan Greenblatt, Business Model Needed to Promote Social Enterprise, S.F.
CHRON., May 31, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/05
/30/EDOR1JMHF8.DTL; Keren Raz, What is a Flexible Purpose Corporation?
(Sept. 8, 2010), http://charitylawyerblog.com/2010/09/08/what-is-a-flexible
-purpose-corporation-by-keren-raz/ (describing the flexible purpose corporation
and its differences from the benefit corporation).
23. See OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047 (2009) (permitting corporations to include
in their articles "a provision authorizing or directing the corporation to conduct
the business of the corporation in a manner that is environmentally and socially
responsible"); see also Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability,
Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOwA L. REV.
987, 1019-20 (2009) (describing the Oregon provision).
24. Some of the statutes make this point more vociferously than others.
Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 5-6C-02(b)-(c) (LexisNexis 2011)
("This subtitle applies only to benefit corporations.. . . The existence of a
provision of this subtitle does not of itself create an implication that a contrary
or different rule of law is or would be applicable to a corporation that is not a
benefit corporation. This subtitle does not affect a statute or rule of law as it
applies to a corporation that is not a benefit corporation.") and VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11A, § 21.02(b) (2011) (similar) with S.B. 2170, 214th Leg., 2nd Ann. Sess.
(N.J. 2011) (describing the act as merely supplementing its general corporate
law).
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for-profit corporate statutory and decisional law will fill the gaps.25
Although it exists under a separate statutory framework,
"benefit corporation" status is available both to newly forming
corporations that may use the form from their inception and to
existing for-profit corporations that adopt benefit corporation form
by amending their charters.26 The statutes use labeling and voting
requirements to protect initial and existing shareholders from
confusion. Upon adopting this status, charter documents, and in
Maryland the stock certificates, must be clearly labeled or re-labeled
to include the term "benefit corporation."27 Those purchasing shares
in the benefit corporation and inspecting its documents are thus
placed on notice of the special nature of the corporation in question,
if not specifically of the limits on what a benefit corporation may or
may not do. Clearer labeling would be provided if the corporation's
name were required to include the "benefit" term, as state law often
demands inclusion of a designation of limited liability in other
forms.28 In May 2011, Maryland added the requirement of a benefit
legend into corporate names;29 it is thus far the only state to have
done so.
For an existing business corporation to reinvent itself as a
benefit corporation, the statutes demand significant support for the
change among shareholders. Charter amendments require a vote of
at least two-thirds of the outstanding shareholders, with the request
for a vote providing notice of the change.30 In Vermont, the notice of
a shareholder meeting at which a change to benefit corporation
status will be approved "shall include a statement from the board of
directors of the reasons why the board is proposing the amendment
and the anticipated effect on the shareholders of becoming a benefit
corporation."31 Requiring specific notice and a statement of reasons
25. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 5-6C-02(a) (LexisNexis
2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.02(a), (d) (2011).
26. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 5-6C-03 (LexisNexis 2011);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-784 to -785 (2011).
27. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 5-6C-05 (LexisNexis 2011); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.03(a)(1), 21.04, 21.05 (2011).
28. See, e.g., VT. STAT ANN. tit. 11, § 3005(a) (2011) (requiring limited
liability companies to include those words or abbreviations like "LLC" in their
names and requiring low-profit limited liability companies to include those
words or the abbreviation "L3C").
29. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 1-502(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011).
This change was approved on May 19, 2011, and was part of legislation
enabling benefit limited liability company status, on terms analogous to the
benefit corporation statute.
30. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns §§ 5-6C-03, 5-6C-04 (LexisNexis
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-3 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.05(2) (2011) (allowing individual corporations to set a voting requirement
above the two-thirds floor); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-785 (2011) (requiring such an
amendment be approved by "all shareholders entitled to vote").
31. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.05(1) (2011). Virginia expressly requires
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provides greater information to shareholders whose interest may be
transformed by the change to benefit corporation status. Similar
notice and supermajority voting requirements apply if a business
corporation merges with a benefit corporation. 32 Notably, these
requirements for opting into benefit corporation status apply to
benefit corporations seeking to resume ordinary business
corporation status as well.33
B. Public Benefit
The main thrust of benefit corporation statutes is to require
these entities to pursue purposes beyond profit-making. A benefit
corporation must be formed for a "general public benefit," meaning a
"material, positive impact on society and the environment."34 Other
than in the New Jersey statute, general public benefit is defined by
measurement against a "third-party standard,"35 and all statutes
permit incorporators to also pursue more "specific public benefits."
They include:
Providing [low income or underserved] individuals or
communities with beneficial products or services;
Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or
communities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course
of business;
Preserving [or improving] the environment;
Improving human health;
Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge;
Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit
that the amendment follow its typical corporate protocol for article
amendments, which requires the board to notify shareholders of the
amendment item on the meetipg notice and to explain the board's position on it.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-785 (West 2011).
32. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-3 to 18-4 (West 2011).
33. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-786 (2011).
34. S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. §§ 2, 5 (Haw. 2011); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & AsS'NS §§ 5-6C-01(c), 5-6C-06(A) (LexisNexis 2011); see also N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2011) (similar); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(4)
(2011) (using virtually identical language); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011)
(similar).
35. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 5-6C-01(c) (LexisNexis 2011); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(4) (West
2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 2 (Haw. 2011).
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purpose; or[and]
The accomplishment of any other particular [identifiable]
benefit for society or the environment. 36
The statutes provide little clarification of the hierarchy of
purposes a benefit corporation will serve. Except in Virginia, the
statutes do state that while a benefit corporation may adopt
purposes to pursue specific public benefits, these specific public
benefits do not limit its obligation to pursue a general public
benefit.37 However, general and specific public benefits may be
articulated in addition to other purposes for which a corporation
may be created, and these public benefits may, but need not, limit
more traditional business purposes. 38  Finally, the statutes all
declare that the general or specific public benefits that benefit
corporations pursue "are in the best interests of the corporation,"
seemingly conclusively.39 This provision alone might be used to
trump potential shareholder claims that directors' decisions to
pursue general or specific public benefits undermine the best
interests of the corporation when they interfere with profit
maximization or other business goals. The benefit corporation
statutes, however, offer greater detail on how directors ought to
make decisions and provide additional liability shields.
C. Directorial Obligations and Protections
Each statute explains the obligations of benefit corporation
directors. They are required to consider the impact of their
decisions on shareholders, employees of the corporation, subsidiaries
and suppliers, "customers [to the extent they are] beneficiaries of
the general or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit
corporation," the community, society, and the local and global
environment.40 Some later-enacted statutes clarify that directors
36. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 5-6C-01(d) (LexisNexis 2011)
(bracketed language included in all but Maryland statute); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:18-1 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(6) (2011); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-782 (West 2011); see also S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 5(b)
(Haw. 2011) (providing a similar list and also including using patents for
certain purposes).
37. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 5-6C-06(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(b) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08(b)
(2011).
38. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 5-6C-06(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(a)-(b) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08(a)
(2011).
39. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'Ns § 5-6C-06(c) (LexisNexis 2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(c) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08(c) (2011);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-787(B) (2011).
40. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 5-6C-07(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(a) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1)(C)
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need not prioritize any particular person's or group's interests in
their deliberations. Unless an individual benefit corporation elects
to do so through a statement in its charter, directors may take
action based on the effects of their decisions on any one of these
groups or interests. 41
The intent of this language appears to be broadening the range
of appropriate considerations in directorial decision making, in order
to give directors discretion to make decisions favoring social mission
achievement over profit-maximization. The statutes' permission for
a director to also "consider any other pertinent factors or the
interests of any other group that the director determines are
appropriate to consider"42 goes even further down this road.
Moreover, in case this wide range of potential justifications for
directorial decisions does not sufficiently comfort benefit corporation
directors, the statutes also specifically provide directors of benefit
corporations with immunity from liability for performance of their
duties within the broad discretion described above 43 and provide
that no duty of such a director runs to the corporations'
beneficiaries. 44
This language is clearly modeled on language from constituency
statutes, also known as anti-takeover legislation. Such statutes
permit directors to consider nonshareholder constituencies in
weighing takeover offers and other decisionS45 and have been
criticized as simply giving directors cover to vote against control-
shifting transactions and to take other actions in order to entrench
themselves in their positions.46  The broad discretion benefit
(2011) (bracketed text is in Vermont statute); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(A)(1)
(2011).
41. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(b)-(c) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11A, § 21.09(a)(2)-(3) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(A)(3) (2011).
42. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 5-6C-07(a) (LexisNexis 2011); see
also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(b)(2) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.09(a)(2) (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(A)(2)(b) (West 2011); S.B.
298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 6(a)(H) (Haw. 2011).
43. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 5-6C-07(c) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(d) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(c)-(d)
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(C) (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. §
6(b) (Haw. 2011).
44. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 5-6C-07(b) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10 (West 2011) (clarifying the limited rights to sue);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(e) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790 (2011)
(similar to New Jersey statute). Some later-enacted statutes provide similarly
broad discretion and immunity from liability for benefit corporation officers.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-8 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.11
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-789 (2011).
45. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 187,
214-15 (1991); Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow
Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 85, 94-97 (1999).
46. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNoMIc
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corporation statutes accord to directors can likewise be faulted for
giving directors unbridled discretion, with which they might pursue
social good or might pursue foolish or self-serving practices.
Provisions in the later-enacted statutes suggest that their
drafters may have had specific concerns about protecting benefit
directors in the takeover context. These statutes require directors to
consider "the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit
corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the benefit
corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that these
interests may be best served by the continued independence of the
benefit corporation." 47 Thus, directors of benefit corporations appear
protected from personal liability on claims that they have
insufficiently produced public benefits or inadequately pursued
profits for shareholders, whether in the context of ordinary business
decisions or control transactions.
D. Third-Party Standard-Setters
The significant divergence between the corporate purposes and
directorial obligations in business corporations and benefit
corporations makes it vital that shareholders and others can
differentiate the two. The crucible here is the issue of public benefit:
only corporations pursuing a general (and perhaps also specific)
public benefit can qualify as benefit corporations. 48 Those that do
not pursue a public benefit are excluded from the category. Rather
than entrusting a government agency to make these initial
determinations, the benefit corporation statutes delegate this
responsibility to third-party standard-setters. All of the statutes
anticipate that such third parties will make available standards "for
defining, reporting, and assessing" the social and environmental
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991) ("[A] manager told to serve two
masters (a little for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been
freed of both and is answerable to neither."); Lucien Arye Bebchuck, Federalism
and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate
Law, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1435, 1493 (1992) (stating "the primary effect of these
constituency statutes is simply to enhance managers' discretion in responding
to hostile takeover bids"). See generally Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate
Fiduciary Principles for the Post-Contractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561,
621-23 (1996) (making this criticism and noting the literature); Brett H.
McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1231-36 (2004) (reviewing the literature).
47. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(a)(6) (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
788(A)(1)(f) (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 6(a)(E) (Haw. 2011); see
also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1)(F) (2011) (containing very similar
language); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(4) (2011) (stating that no
"different or higher standard of care" applies in contexts where control is an
issue).
48. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 5-6C-06 (LexisNexis 2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-787 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,§ 21.08 (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 2 (Haw. 2011).
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performance of aspiring benefit corporations. 49 The statutes decline
to provide even minimum content for such standards. In addition,
they do not dictate how the standards should be applied, how often,
or by whom.
Instead, the statutes simply mandate that standard-setters be
independent and transparent.50 Sufficient independence is shown if
the standard "is developed by a person [or entity] that is
independent of the benefit corporation."51 The Maryland statute
offers no further definition of independence, but the later-enacted
statutes define independence to exclude those with direct or indirect
"material relationships" with the benefit corporation or its
subsidiaries, including current or recent employment, familial
relationships with executive officers, or direct or indirect ownership
or management of five percent or more of the benefit corporation's
equity. 52 For transparency to be sufficient, each statute requires the
certifying party to make publicly available four types of
information.53  Standard-setters must publicize "the factors
considered when measuring the performance of a business, the
relative weightings of those factors, and the identity of the persons
who developed and control changes to the standard, and the process
by which those changes were made."5 4
B Lab has been deeply committed to and involved with the
passage of benefit corporation statutes.55 Its survey and audit
49. See S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 12 (Haw. 2011); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & AsS'NS § 5-6C-01(e) (LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1
(West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(8) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782
(2011).
50. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 5-6C-01(e) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(8)
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 12
(Haw. 2011).
51. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 5-6C-01(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2011)
(bracketed language is only in Maryland statute); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1
(West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(8) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
782 (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 12(2) (Haw. 2011).
52. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.03(a)(5) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th
Sess. § 12 (Haw. 2011).
53. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 5-6C-01(e) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(8)
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 12
(Haw. 2011).
54. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 5-6C-01(e)(1)-(2) (LexisNexis
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.03(a)(8)(B) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011). The Hawaii legislation
adds "an accounting of the sources of financial support for the organization that
developed and controls revisions to the standard, with sufficient detail to
disclose any relationships that could reasonably be considered to present a
potential conflict of interest." S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 12(3)(E) (Haw.
2011).
55. See B LAB, 2011 Annual Report: If Not Now, When, The Case for B Corp,
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processes are fully documented online 56 and thus appear to fit the
transparency requirements, and B Lab will be independent of any
unrelated potential incorporators.57 B Lab evaluates potential B
corporations using the B Impact Assessment, which looks at issues
of corporate accountability, employee policy, products' benefit to
consumers, the company's relationship with its community, and its
impact on the environment.5 8 The assessment contains a total of
two-hundred points, and companies must score eighty points to be
certified and granted access to the B Corp mark.59 B Lab also audits
twenty percent of those companies who qualify for B Corp
certification every two years.60
Although the third-party standard-setter role seems tailor-made
for B Lab, numerous existing standard-setters and entity-
certification programs would also appear to qualify under the
statutes.6' Certifiers of fair labor practices consider social and, to
some degree, environmental performance in their standards.62 They
are transparent and would likely be independent in most cases.
Certifiers of high environmental performance, such as those
authorized to assess compliance with the ISO 14001 Environmental
Management System standard, could likewise qualify as third-party
CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/resourcesbcorp/documents/B
%20Corp-2011-Annual-Report.pdf.
56. See Who Certifies?, supra note 19.
57. Id.
58. See B Lab, B Impact Assessment 2010 Version 2.0,http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/2010-B-Impact-Assess
ment%20(1).pdf. B Lab is currently beta testing an updated impact
assessment. See B Lab, Registration for Public Beta V3.0 Impact Assessment,http://b-lab.force.com/GIIRS/BcorpRegistration (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
59. See B Impact Assessment 2010 Version 2.0, supra note 58.
60. See B Lab, Become a B Corporation, CERTIFIED B CORP.,http://www.bcorporation.net/become (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
61. Indeed, the B Lab website itself offers a number of suggestions of other
possible third-party standard-setters, including "Global Reporting Initiative("GRI"), GreenSeal, Underwriters Laboratories ("UL"), ISO2600, [and] Green
America," as well as a list of over one hundred raters on a referenced raters list.
See B Lab, Benefit Corporation - Legal FAQs, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/Benefit%20Corporation
%20-%2OLegal%2OProvisions%20and%20FAQ.pdf. But see Doug Morris,
Benefit Corporation Laws Hold Social Ventures Accountable, SUSTAINABLE Bus.
OREGON (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.sustainablebusinessoregon.com/columns
/2011/03/benefit-corporation-laws-hold-social.html ("The B corporation standard
is not mentioned specifically in the statutes], but few, if any, other third party
standards currently exist. Therefore a benefit corporation may also need to
become a certified B corporation.").
62. See The SA8000 Standard, Soc. ACCOUNTABILITY INT'L,
http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=937&pare
ntlD=479&nodelD=1 (last visited July 30, 2011); WRAP 12 Principles,
WORLDWIDE RESPONSIBLE ACCREDITED PRODUCTION,
http://www.wrapcompliance.org/en/wrap-12-principles-certification (last visited
Aug. 28, 2011).
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standard-setters with a few changes. 63 Even corporate governance
advisory firms might be adjusted to fit the bill. As they are already
beginning to offer advisory services to institutions and individuals
seeking socially responsible investments, 64 retooling to certify
benefit corporations could likely be done with ease.
Likewise, current product-focused standard-setters could also
enter the market to qualify benefit corporations. Consider Cradle to
Cradle ("C2C"), a certification offered by McDonough Braungart
Design Chemistry LLC ("MBDC").65 C2C is a multi-attribute
product label that is licensed to those meeting MBDC's criteria for
Material Health, Material Reutilization, Renewable Energy Use,
Water Stewardship, and Social Responsibility. 66  C2C was not
designed to vet aspiring benefit corporations. Rather, C2C is
currently offered to products, such as the Method line of soap and
cleaning products, rather than to entities.67  However, MBDC
publicizes its standards for environmental and social performance
(required only for the tiers of certification beyond "basic"), and is
transparent regarding how the standards are weighted68 and the
identity of those who develop and control changes to the standards.69
Thus, it could offer certification to potential benefit corporations. It
is not yet clear whether the benefit corporation certification market
will attract rating agencies, governance advisory firms, or existing
product or entity certifiers. In any case, meeting the statutes'
limited transparency and independence requirements will not be a
significant barrier.
E. Enforcement
Whether or not B Lab is joined by other standard-setters, it is
63. See generally ISO 14001:2004, Abstract, Environmental management
systems - Requirements with guidance for use, INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION
(2004) (specifying "requirements for an environmental management system to
enable an organization to develop and implement a policy and objectives which
take into account legal requirements and other requirements to which the
organization subscribes, and information about significant environmental
aspects").
64. See Services for PRI Signatories, MSCI, http://www.msci.com/products
/esg/unpri.signatories/ (last visited July 30, 2011).
65. Certification Overview, MBDC CRADLE TO CRADLE, http://mbdc.com
/detail.aspx?inkid=2&sublink=8 (last visited July 12, 2011).
66. Certification Criteria, MBDC CRADLE TO CRADLE, http://mbdc.com/detail
.aspx?linkid=2&sublink=9 (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
67. Certified Products, MBDC CRADLE TO CRADLE, http://c2c.mbdc.com/c2c
/list.php?order=type (last visited July 30, 2011).
68. See Cradle to Cradle Certification Program, Version 2.1.1, MBDC
CRADLE TO CRADLE (Jan. 2010), http://www.mbdc.com/images/Outline
_CertificationV2_1_1.pdf.
69. See FAQ, Who Develops the Cradle to Cradle® Certification Criteria?,
MBDC CRADLE TO CRADLE, http://mbdc.com/detail.aspx?linkid=20&sublink=25
(last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
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not the only body empowered to monitor and enforce the public
benefit to which benefit corporations are devoted. The statutes also
impose disclosure obligations upon benefit corporations, requiring
them to provide annual benefit reports to their shareholders and to
post them on their public websites. 70 The statutes describe the
contents of this report differently. Again, the Maryland statute is
briefer than the later enactments, but all require timely benefit
reports including elements of description and assessment. All
benefit corporations must describe how they have pursued their
general and specific public benefit purposes and any circumstances
that hindered their ability to do so.71 Vermont's statute also
demands that benefit corporations give a statement of actions they
can take to improve performance in the future.72 Vermont, New
Jersey, and Hawaii also require the report to disclose the names and
addresses of a "benefit director" and optional "benefit officer,"
director compensation, a statement by the benefit director, and the
names of anyone owning five percent or more of the corporation's
stock.73 Assessment requires each benefit corporation to consider
and report how well it performed in accordance with its third-party
standard as compared with prior performance. 74
In addition to demanding publication, the New Jersey statute
requires the report to be filed with the state Department of the
Treasury, on penalty of forfeiture of benefit corporation status.75
Vermont's statute does not require filing, but demands that benefit
corporations must submit the annual report for shareholder
approval or rejection. 76  The statute does not explain the
consequences if the report is rejected. Hawaii's statute disavows
any government involvement explicitly, mandating that the report
state that "the sustainable business corporation and its activities
are subject to the oversight of the board of the sustainable business
corporation and are not subject to the direct oversight, regulation, or
endorsement of any governmental body."77
70. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns. § 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14 (2011); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-791 (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 11 (Haw. 2011).
71. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns. § 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a) (2011);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791 (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 11(a)(1)
(Haw. 2011).
72. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a)(1)(D) (2011).
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(a) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.14(a) (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 11(3)-(6) (Haw. 2011).
74. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns. § 5-6C-08(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(a)(2) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.14(a)(2) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(A)(2)(a) (2011); S.B. 298, 2011
Leg., 26th Sess. § 11(a)(2) (Haw. 2011).
75. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(a)(6)(d) (West 2011).
76. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(c) (2011).
77. S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 11(a)(8) (Haw. 2011).
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The positions of benefit director and benefit officer merit
additional explanation. Vermont, New Jersey, and Hawaii require
benefit corporations to name a benefit director and permit them to
appoint a benefit officer. 78 The benefit director must include in the
annual report her own statement assessing whether the benefit
corporation and its directors have acted in compliance with the
benefit purposes of the corporation during the relevant period.79 If a
benefit director opines that the benefit corporation has failed to
meet the requirements of the law, she must describe these failures.80
In New Jersey and Vermont, benefit directors are immune from
personal liability for their performance of these evaluative tasks, so
long as they act in good faith and do not engage in intentional
misconduct, knowing violations of law, or self-dealing. 81 Unlike the
benefit director, a benefit officer is optional in every enacting
jurisdiction. If a benefit corporation chooses to select one (who may
be the same person as the benefit director), the benefit officer "shall
perform the duties in the management of the benefit corporation
relating to the purpose of the corporation to create public benefit."82
Identifying at least one and perhaps two roles with clear
responsibility for tracking and assessing public benefit provides
additional monitoring and enforcement resources over mandated
disclosure alone.
In addition, all benefit corporation statutes other than
Maryland's, offer a special right of action often called a "benefit
enforcement proceeding" to enforce the special duties of benefit
corporation directors and officers and the public benefit purposes of
the corporation. 83 The statutes limit potential plaintiffs in benefit
enforcement proceedings to shareholders entitled to bring derivative
actions and, in some cases other groups, if specified in a
corporation's charter.84 Thus, the additional proceeding does not
expand standing to challenge conduct of benefit corporation
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,§ 21.10
(2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 7(a) (Haw. 2011).
79. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(c) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.10(c)(3) (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 7(c) (Haw. 2011).
80. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(c) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.10(c)(4) (2011).
81. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(e) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.10(f) (2011).
82. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-9 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.12
(2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 9 (Haw. 2011).
83. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.13 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790 (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. §
10 (Haw. 2011).
84. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(b) (2011) (empowering directors,
individuals or groups owning ten percent or more of the equity of a parent of the
benefit corporation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b) (West 2011) (similar); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-790(B) (2011) (including no rights for owners of a parent
company); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 10 (Haw. 2011).
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fiduciaries, but does express support for an expanded range of
inquiry in suits by traditional parties.
As yet, there is no case law addressing the obligations of benefit
corporation fiduciaries, and the statutes do not speak to how courts
should analyze such claims. One commentator argues that "the core
duty of the benefit corporation can be defined as the duty to secure
profits for the shareholders while considering the socially beneficial
purposes of the corporation."85 This seems a fair statement as far as
it goes, but without greater legislative explanation or judicial
interpretation, it remains difficult to provide guidance to fiduciaries
in situations where profit and social benefit goals conflict.
F. Conclusion
The benefit corporation is thus significantly different from both
traditional nonprofit and for-profit business forms and from other
hybrid forms. By retaining traditional business purposes and
adding the requirement of pursuing general public benefit, the
benefit corporation allows entities to pursue a dual mission of both
profit and social good. This duality of mission contrasts sharply
with traditional nonprofit and for-profit forms, but is consistent with
all other hybrid forms.
The benefit corporation, however, also differs in substantial
ways from other hybrids currently available. Unlike the United
Kingdom's CIC, the benefit corporation may offer investors
unlimited midstream and residual returns and is subject to no
government regulation of its purposes or activities. These attributes
are shared by L3Cs, but the benefit corporation has more rigid
governance structures than the almost fully flexible governance by
contract in an L3C. The benefit corporation also requires greater
disclosure than the L3C, and the Vermont, New Jersey, and Hawaii
enactments require entities to vest particular individuals with
responsibility for stewarding and reporting on the organization's
public benefit achievements. These disclosure and fiduciary
authorization mandates also represent a divergence from the B Corp
structure, though B Corps and benefit corporations share the
fundamental idea of third-party review of public benefit purposes.
This idea of delegating to private parties the responsibility to certify
the bona fides of hybrid entities is not found in either the CIC or
L3C.
II. ASSESSING THE BENEFIT CORPORATION
The range and diversity of emerging hybrid organizational
forms raises the question of which is best. It is likely impossible to
answer this question for all social enterprises in all situations, but
85. MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN
ENTREPRENEURS 128 (2011).
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this Part will undertake a preliminary assessment of how the
benefit corporation serves the needs and goals of these entities and
their founders. Fundamentally, founders and operators of social
enterprises unsatisfied with traditional nonprofit or for-profit forms
seek a type of organization that will legally establish their sense of a
dual profit-making and social mission and enforce it over time.
They would also like a hybrid form to expand the range of funding
streams they can effectively access. Further, they seek to use the
hybrid form as part of their effort to brand their social enterprises to
enable them to market their products and services to consumers,
business partners, and others as special and different from those
offered by typical nonprofit charities and for-profit businesses.
Many believe that achieving all or some combination of these three
goals is the only way to make their endeavors sustainable. This
Part evaluates whether and to what extent the benefit corporation
form will accomplish these various and often overlapping goals. The
exercise here is a limited case study of one form of organization.
But, this effort will begin the important work of theorizing more
generally the value hybrid forms offer to social enterprises.
A. Articulating and Enforcing a Dual Mission
Those forming a social enterprise have both profit or business
goals and social goals and many want to pursue them both using the
same entity.86 A hybrid form is desirable if it will help them to
articulate and enforce this dual mission of profit and social good.
1. The Limitations of Traditional Forms
One might think social entrepreneurs could use traditional
nonprofit or for-profit forms to house their dual mission enterprises.
After all, nonprofit forms do not bar profit-making. These forms do,
however, dramatically cabin profit distribution under the
nondistribution constraint.87 This constraint is imposed by state
law on all nonprofit forms of organization and will prevent a social
enterprise formed as a nonprofit from distributing net profits to
those with organizational control, including shareholders, other
investors, directors, and officers. 88 In addition, if formed as a tax-
exempt nonprofit, a social enterprise will be prohibited from
distributing net profits by the inurement, private benefit, and excess
86. Social entrepreneurs view the lack of a legal form for their enterprises
as a significant problem. See Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 85 ("A recent survey
showed that 71% of social entrepreneurs believed that the choice of legal
structure was the single greatest challenge for their ventures.").
87. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 838.
88. See id. ("A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is
barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise
control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees.").
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benefit transaction rules under federal tax law. 89 Therefore, if a
social entrepreneur wishes to distribute profits to investors, a
nonprofit form is a nonstarter. Even in the unlikely scenario of a
social entrepreneur interested in pursuing profits from his
enterprise solely to reinvest them, various anticommerciality
restrictions might prove challenging for obtaining tax-exemptions. 90
Thus, nonprofit form will be suboptimal for many dual mission
organizations.
The problems with adopting a traditional for-profit form for
social enterprise are more complex and arise from both legal and
nonlegal sources. At inception, it appears permissible to include
charitable or social goals as part of a corporation's purposes. 91 Yet,
anecdotal reports suggest that in some states, inclusion of such
goals as a major component of corporate purposes may stall or block
acceptance of articles by the secretary of state. Typically, LLC law
will be flexible enough to allow adoption of both profit and social
purposes, though partnership statutes requiring a "business
purpose" may create barriers to social enterprises in that form.92
Still, there are concerns that in a social enterprise formed as a
traditional for-profit, fiduciaries will be hemmed in by their
responsibilities to pursue profits for owners. 93 There is considerable
89. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010) (permitting exemption only to
organizations that take "no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual"); I.R.C. §4958 (2010) (imposing
penalty taxes on insiders engaging in "excess benefit transactions" with their
exempt organizations); see also MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 248-64
(2004) (describing these doctrines in detail).
90. See generally Evelyn Brody, Business Activities of Nonprofit
Organizations: Legal Boundary Problems, in NONPROFITS & BUSINESS 83
(Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2009) (reviewing legal constraints
placed on nonprofits' business activities); see also Dana Brakman Reiser,
Charity Law's Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 18-25 (2011) (describing
the anticommerciality bias of current tax exemption law).
91. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA.
L. & Bus. REV. 163, 169 (2008); see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
§ 2.01 Reporter's Note 6 (1994) ("[Tjhere is little doubt that [restrictions on the
general profit-making objective] would normally be permissible if agreed to by
all the shareholders. Such an agreement might be embodied in the certificate of
incorporation, or not.").
92. Compare REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. AcT § 104(b) (clarifying that an LLC
"may have any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for profit"), with REV.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997) (stating that any "association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a
partnership"). See also Robert R. Keatinge, LLCs and Nonprofit
Organizations-For-Profits, Nonprofits, and Hybrids, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
553, 555, 583 (2009).
93. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41-42
(2006) (describing shareholder primacy as a "foundational principle" that
"informs every aspect of corporate and securities law" in a work arguing
corporate law should embrace a broader sense of proper corporate purposes);
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debate about the degree to which for-profit fiduciaries may properly
pursue other purposes without breaching their duties.94 Moreover,
with the many obstacles in the path of a successful shareholder suit
to challenge fiduciary compliance, 95 lawsuits may not be the most
salient risk for fiduciaries in a for-profit social enterprise. Even
those who argue that for-profits possess substantial leeway to
pursue social goals seem to be arguing about the edges of for-profit
activity, not its core.96 Whatever the correct answer is on the state
of the law, fiduciaries rightly or wrongly are often wedded to the
idea that in a for-profit entity their foremost goal should be
maximizing the entity's value to its owners.97
Practical obstacles will also likely confound for-profit fiduciaries
who seek to maintain a dual mission, especially if they desire to
expand their social enterprises and require capitalization beyond
the founders' own funds. To scale up a social enterprise, capital can
be borrowed or ownership can be expanded, and usually some
combination will be needed. To raise capital by expanding
ownership without upsetting the stability of a dual mission, social
enterprises will need to attract and retain owners equally committed
to that dual mission. Dual-class stock structures, partnership
agreements, shareholder agreements in closely held corporations,
and operating agreements in LLCs can all be used to limit owners'
LANE, supra note 85, at 119. Comments in a recent Delaware Chancery Court
case have reinforced these fears. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("Directors of a for-profit Delaware
corporation cannot deploy a rights plan to defend a business strategy that
openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization-at least not consistently
with the directors' fiduciary duties under Delaware law.").
94. Compare, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 17-18 (1986)
(describing the obligations of corporate fiduciaries "to maximize the value of the
company's shares"), with e.g., Elhauge, supra note 3, at 735-39.
95. These include most importantly the demand requirement and business
judgment rule protection. Where these protections are less certain or do not
apply, as may be the case in suits alleging oppression by a controlling
shareholder in close corporations, litigation may become a more realistic cause
for concern.
96. See Elhauge, supra note 3, at 735-39, 842-48; Antony Page, Has
Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals for Reform, 107 MICH. L. REV. 979,
987-89 (2009); Sneirson, supra note 24, at 995-1007.
97. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2073 (2001) (noting that
"[n]orms in American business circles, starting with business school education,
emphasize the value, appropriateness, and indeed the justice of maximizing
shareholder wealth"). But see Sneirson, supra note 24, at 1011-12 and sources
cited (arguing the claims of shareholder primacy's hold on businesspersons is
overstated); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L.
277, 290-91 (1998) (similar). Particularly interesting and subtle arguments on
this matter can be found in JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR
POTENTATES 37-55 (1989). This empirical study found corporate directors' self-
reporting of their obligations often included rhetoric about shareholder primacy,
but then explained a more broadly-focused and textured reality.
2011] 609
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
ability to undo a dual mission. These structures can be
implemented in an attempt to match dual mission minded investors
with social enterprise investments.98 Of course, one cannot be sure
that a sufficient pool of investors with preferences aligning to the
founders' will exist. Indeed, even investors initially committed to
the dual mission might change their minds if the entity becomes
sufficiently successful, and any of these private arrangements can
be changed by the very people who would benefit financially from
changing them.
If a for-profit social enterprise wants to draw market-rate
investors, its dual mission will be squarely put at risk. Consensus
favoring a dual mission can easily break down and market-rate
investors may refuse to invest or quickly or detrimentally sell off
their ownership stakes. Rather than fearing litigation, the founder
of a for-profit social enterprise may instead worry about locking in a
dual mission legacy,99 about sufficient access to capital, or both.
Dual mission is not easily embedded in traditional for-profit forms.
Ideally, a hybrid organization would offer a solution to this dual
mission dilemma. To solve it, a hybrid form of organization should
provide guidance on which goal, profit maximization or social good
production, has priority and in what situations this priority must be
given. This does not necessarily mean that either profit
maximization or social good production must be prioritized every
time the two come into conflict. In order to ease the tension
inherent in a dual mission organization, some structure is needed
for balancing these goals. This structure must work predictably and
relatively transparently, and there must be some method for
enforcing it.
2. The Benefit Corporation and Dual Mission Articulation
The benefit corporation statutes not only permit, but require,
articulation of an expressly dual mission. These are corporations
formed for profit and to pursue a "general public benefit."100 This
express dual mission mandate contrasts starkly with traditional
nonprofit forms, which prohibit entities from acting to pursue profits
for owners. It also represents a significant change from for-profit
forms in which some pursuit of social good is certainly within legal
bounds, but significant sacrificing of profits to further social goals
engenders real risks.
98. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 90, at 45-47 (describing how founders
may entrench their dual missions in various for-profit forms of organization).
99. Cf. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 32 (Del. Ch.
2010) (controlling shareholders argued they needed to undertake defensive
measures to protect their chosen corporate culture after their deaths).
100. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS'NS §§ 5-6C-01(c), 5-6C-06(a)
(LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11A, § 21.03(a)(4) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011).
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When one thinks more deeply about how a dual mission will be
articulated in a benefit corporation, however, doubts emerge. The
requirement of general public benefit is vague and undefined. The
determination of whether a particular organization's goals pursue a
general public benefit is left to an unregulated third-party standard-
setter.101 Moreover, the statutes provide no baseline or guidance for
the standards these third parties should use to make this
determination; they require only transparency and independence. If
a standard-setter clearly and transparently sets low standards, it
may qualify unrelated entities to form as benefit corporations just as
would a standard-setter with higher standards, leaving the door
open to greenwashing or even fraud. Perhaps transparency will
enable consumers and investors to judge the mix of profit and social
good individual benefit corporations serve based on which standard-
setter is used. This, however, would require highly motivated
consumers and investors to engage in significant research.102 At the
moment, benefit corporations require only formal articulation of a
dual mission, and oversight over the genuineness of these
statements is lacking.
3. The Benefit Corporation and Dual Mission Enforcement
Third-party standard-setters, fiduciaries, and shareholders all
play enforcement roles in the benefit corporation. Except in New
Jersey, third-party standard-setters serve as initial gatekeepers; in
order to qualify for benefit corporation status, an entity must meet
the requirements of an independent third-party standard.103 As
noted earlier, these standard-setters play this certification role
bounded by neither standards nor oversight. Moreover, the role of
the standard-setters themselves in ongoing enforcement is less
clear. All of the statutes envision public benefit assessments in
annual benefit reports will be made with reference to the third-party
standard.104 But, none of the statutes specify whether or how
standard-setters should be involved in vetting public-benefit
provision after incorporation. Standard-setters may choose to
engage in auditing or other monitoring functions to boost
enforcement or they may consider their role complete when initial
101. Although the New Jersey statute does not define general public benefit
with reference to a third-party standard, it does not offer any other means for
determining the bona fides of incorporators' public-benefit claims.
102. Even if this mechanism is workable, it undercuts the ability of benefit
corporation status alone to operate as an effective brand, a point to which I will
return in Part II.C.
103. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns. § 5-6C-01(c) (LexisNexis 2011);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(4) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011).
104. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS. § 5-6C-08(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-11(a)(2) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.14(a)(2) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(A)(2)(a) (2011); S.B. 298, 2011
Leg., 26th Sess. § 11(a)(2) (Haw. 2011).
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certification is granted or denied.
Shareholders are also involved at the initial adoption of benefit
corporation status and on any exit from that status. Shareholders
must be granted express notice of the change and must vote by a
supermajority to approve it.105 These provisions may have been
drafted to protect unsuspecting investors from being surprised by a
benefit corporation's dual mission orientation. Yet, the notice and
voting requirements apply in both directions. Thus, they also
protect the benefit corporation and enforce its dual mission against
termination without a strong consensus among shareholders.
Outside the context of transformation to fully for-profit status,
though, the statutes offer little guidance to shareholders or
fiduciaries on the thorny issue of how profit and social good should
be balanced. They allow directors to forego profit maximization in
favor of social good production or vice versa,106 but they do not
instruct directors on how to exercise this broad discretion. Directors
are not told to err on the side of social good in every decision, to
pursue more profit than social good across the enterprise, or the
opposite of either instruction. Rather, directors are merely
instructed to consider the impact of every decision on
nonshareholder constituencies.10 7 In addition, the statutes provide
directors with a broad range of interests that they may act to
benefit, and the role of benefit corporation director is constructed to
be highly discretionary. 108 Thus, the statutes impose no clear
framework for directorial decision making. Without one, it is
difficult to identify a metric by which shareholders might enforce
fiduciaries' compliance with dual mission.
Shareholders of all benefit corporations retain the
informational, voting, and litigation rights of ordinary shareholders.
Any of these rights could, theoretically, be used to enforce dual
mission. Benefit corporation shareholders may demand to inspect
corporate books and records beyond the benefit report to determine
how a particular mission conflict was resolved. They may vote out
directors who fail to sufficiently pursue their favored balance of
profits and mission. They may even sue directors for a failure to
105. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns. § 5-6C-04(b) (LexisNexis 2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-4(a) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.07(2)(B)
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-786 (2011); S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 3
(Haw. 2011).
106. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS. § 5-6C-07 (LexisNexis 2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(c) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(3)
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(A)(3) (2011).
107. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'Ns. § 5-6C-07 (LexisNexis 2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09 (2011); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(A) (2011).
108. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns. §§ 5-6C-07(a)(1)-(2) (LexisNexis
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(a) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.09(a)(1)-(2) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(A) (2011).
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meet their special fiduciary obligations under the statute, and the
later-enacted statutes also provide for the benefit enforcement
proceeding.109
Still, shareholders are unlikely to be assiduous and consistent
enforcers. Their ability to obtain damages to redress faulty
directorial decisions is significantly limited by ordinary fiduciary
liability concepts like the business judgment rule and will be further
frustrated by benefit directors' broad and unguided discretion and
immunity. Moreover, benefit corporation shareholders have an
additional reason not to engage in enforcement of dual mission-or
at least a serious potential bias toward one-half of it. If a benefit
corporation begins veering away from its dual mission to achieve
greater profits, shareholders stand to gain financially from this
decision. Thus, although many routes exist for shareholder
enforcement, shareholders are uniquely hamstrung as enforcers in
the benefit corporation context.
The statutes uniformly exclude other potential parties from
engaging in enforcement through litigation. Beneficiaries and the
public will not have standing to challenge actions by benefit
corporation directors.110  This position resonates with the
traditionally extremely limited standing to challenge actions by
nonprofit corporate directors.111 This policy is justified as necessary
in order to recruit directors, which are most often uncompensated, to
serve on nonprofit boards. 112  However, the nonprofit context
provides for government enforcement by state attorneys general
and, for exempt nonprofits, the IRS. There is no regulatory role for
any public official in the benefit corporation.113
Other hybrid forms of organization take very different stances
on enforcement than the benefit corporation. The United Kingdom
adopted public enforcement, launching a specialized CIC regulator
in addition to allowing shareholder enforcement of dual mission.114
109. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.13 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790 (2011).
110. This is only a default rule and can be changed by individual benefit
corporations. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b)(2)(d) (West 2011); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(b)(4) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790(B)(2)(c) (2011).
111. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 89, at 324-42.
112. See id. at 324-25. This concern was raised in bar association comments
to proposed New York benefit corporation legislation. See Letter from
Committee on Corporation Law to Speaker Silver and Senator Squadron (Feb.
16, 2011) (on file with author) (noting concern regarding "attracting qualified
individuals to serve" as benefit corporation directors even with limited
standing).
113. The Hawaii statute makes this abundantly clear. S.B. 298, 2011 Leg.,
26th Sess. § 11(a)(8) (Haw. 2011).
114. See Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act
2004, c. 27, Part 2, § 27, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004
/27/section/27; About Us, CIC REGULATOR, http://www.bis.gov.uk/cicregulator
/about-us (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
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The regulator possesses broad authority to investigate, remove
fiduciaries, and even terminate CICs found out of compliance.115
L3Cs rely solely on private enforcement, and the contours of
this enforcement remain somewhat unclear. LLC members have
internal means to challenge fiduciary actions and legal standing to
enforce managers' fiduciary obligations.116 The exact scope of these
duties, and the means of their enforcement, is not addressed by the
L3C statute and the nature of LLC fiduciary duties is both contested
and jurisdictionally diverse.117 Moreover, as a species of LLC, an
L3C operating agreement may tailor fiduciary duties to a significant
degree, generally including reducing those obligations when "not
manifestly unreasonable."118 Drawing on the language of the L3C
statutes, John Tyler has suggested that the fiduciary duty of L3C
managers should be understood to require prioritization of
charitable and educational purposes over their profit-making
ones. 119 Further, he has argued that enforcement mechanisms
borrowed from for-profit forms should suffice to enforce these
obligations.12 0  Whether or not these views of L3C fiduciary
obligation and enforcement become widely accepted, the statutes
certainly offer no regulatory or other enforcement vehicles.
Like the benefit corporation, the B Corp retains the existing
enforcement mechanisms of a for-profit corporation, including
shareholder informational and voting rights as well as derivative
suits. This private certification form, however, does not add benefit
directors, benefit officers, or benefit enforcement proceedings found
in some benefit corporation statutes. B Corp status also subjects
adopters to potential audit by B Lab, 121 which B Lab and other
standard-setters may require for benefit corporations, but the
statutes do not require by their terms.
115. See Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act
2004, c. 27, Part 2, §§ 42-51, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga
/2004/27/contents.
116. See, e.g., REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 901-903 (2006) (providing
members with direct rights of action and only members with rights to sue
derivatively, after demand or a showing of demand's futility).
117. See Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC
Manager After More Than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 586(2007).
118. See, e.g., REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 110(d) (2006).
119. See John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having "Two Masters'" A
Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117,
141 (2010).
120. See id. at 154.
121. See B Lab, How Are Companies Certified and Audited as B
Corporations?, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/index.cfm
?fuseaction=modalContent.content&id=f7224b49-ed7f-4037-894c-31c6e3c32178
(last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
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4. The Benefit Corporation's Disclosure Model
The benefit corporation form relies significantly on disclosure,
both to amplify dual mission articulation and to lubricate
enforcement. The benefit reportl 22 gives shareholders and the
public an opportunity to view how the entity reacts to situations in
which profit and social mission conflict. Of course, the benefit report
need not address these questions specifically. It must only report on
public benefits achieved and circumstances that have hindered
public benefit production.123 The Vermont, New Jersey, and Hawaii
statutes demand that benefit corporations provide somewhat greater
information in their benefit reports. They also compel them to
charge a benefit director with a monitoring role, including preparing
an opinion of the entity's public benefit performance.124 The New
Jersey and Vermont statutes also provide for potentially greater
review of the annual report, demanding filing with a government
agency and shareholder approval, respectively.12 5 Whether these
recipients of disclosure will actively enforce is not yet known.
Empowering individuals required to engage activity in the process of
creating and approving disclosures, however, may at least somewhat
improve the likelihood that enforcement action will be taken based
upon them.
In terms of disclosure, benefit corporations occupy a sort of
middle ground between the situations of traditional nonprofit and
for-profit entities. On the one hand, benefit corporations must issue
self-styled disclosures about public benefit provision to shareholders
and allow for public review, a different kind of transparency than
would be required of a nonprofit. Nonprofits must provide
standardized annual reports on their charitable activities to state
attorneys general 26 and, if they are tax-exempt, they must submit
annual informational tax returns to the IRS and make them
public.127 The level and contents of required disclosures for benefit
corporations should provide greater transparency on how a dual
mission is being managed than would be available from a standard
for-profit corporation, partnership, or LLC. Corporations may have
annual reporting obligations to shareholders and the secretary of
122. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 5-6C-08(a) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(a) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a)
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(A) (2011).
123. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 5-6C-08(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(a)(1) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
21.14(a)(1) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(A)(1) (2011).
124. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-11, 14A:18-7(c) (West 2011); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.14(a), 21.10(c)(3) (2011).
125. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(6)(d) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11A, § 21.14(c) (2011).
126. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 89, at 315.
127. See id. at 409-11.
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state, 128 and LLCs may be required to report annually to state
authorities as well. 129 For-profits regulated by federal securities law
may have additional reporting obligations.130  None of these
required reports, however, must contain information regarding the
social goals and achievements of the disclosing organization.
Benefit corporation disclosures are thus fairly robust and are
certainly more closely tailored to address dual mission performance
than either nonprofit or for-profit disclosures.
Benefit corporations also require more disclosure on the
question of social and profit-making activity than any other hybrid
forms currently available in the U.S.131 L3C statutes require no
disclosures beyond the annual reporting obligations derived from
related LLC statutes, which include no requirement of reporting on
the entity's furtherance of charitable and educational purposes. 132
Investor-members in an L3C could certainly demand such reporting,
but it is not statutorily mandated. The B Corp certification requires
B Lab to have access to certified entities for potential audits133 but
does not require any periodic disclosures to it, to investors, or to the
public.
5. Conclusion
In sum, the benefit corporation form is effective in allowing
social enterprises formally to articulate a dual mission. It clearly
allows shareholders to take profits and requires a statement of
purposes for the general public benefit. This is an improvement
over traditional nonprofit and for-profit forms, but does not gain the
128. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§ 16.20, 16.21 (1984) (requiring
corporations to provide shareholders and the secretary of state with annual
reports); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 502 (West 2011) (requiring Delaware
corporations to file annual reports including very limited information with the
secretary of state).
129. See, e.g., REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 209 (2006).
130. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2011) (requiring companies issuing
registered securities to file annual reports with the SEC); § 240.14a-3 (requiring
that annual reports accompany proxy solicitations relating to annual meetings).
131. The highly regulated CIC does require annual reporting on the
achievement of its community benefit, which reports are provided to the
Regulator, are made available to the public, and should be provided to
shareholders. See The Guidance: Statutory Obligations, CIC REGULATOR 2-3(May 14, 2005), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bispartners
/cicregulator/docs/guidance/1 1-957-community-interest-companies-guidance
-chapter-8-statutory-obligations.
132. Illinois, unique among L3C-enacting jurisdictions, has directed that
L3C managers are treated as charitable trustees and regulated by the state
Attorney General. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26(d) (2011). Thus,
Illinois L3Cs will have a reporting obligation that covers their public benefit
activities. See 760 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 55/7(a) (2011).
133. See B Lab, Become a B Corporation, supra note 60 (requiring no
ongoing reporting from "B" licensees, but subjecting them to potential on-site
auditing by B Lab).
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benefit corporation a comparative advantage over other existing
hybrids, which also clearly allow dual mission to be articulated
formally. Indeed, the delegation to third-party standard-setters to
vet this public benefit and the lack of a statutory floor for what
counts as public benefit make low standards and greenwashing
particular concerns for the benefit corporation.
In terms of enforcement, the benefit corporation usefully limits
movement in and out of dual mission status by its shareholder vote
requirements but gives little guidance on enforcing dual mission
outside of the ultimate exit question. Third-party standard-setters
could take a more active role here, but they need not do so under the
statutes. Benefit corporation statutes expressly permit, but do not
require, the pursuit of social goals over profit, and bend over
backwards to protect fiduciaries from liability for their decisions. In
this context, shareholder enforcement will be challenging and
shareholders themselves may become biased toward profit goals or
be bought out by others seeking financial over social gains. Some
statutes may generate more robust enforcement by empowering
benefit directors and creating specialized benefit enforcement
proceedings. These innovations remain untested, but the benefit
corporation's model of enhanced disclosure will at least provide a
mechanism for shareholders and the public to track dual mission.
In relative terms, this low level of enforcement is not damning,
however, as other extant hybrid forms also provide limited
enforcement regimes.
B. Expanding Funding Streams
The ability to effectively articulate and enforce a dual mission is
the baseline requirement for a hybrid organization. It is also
intimately related to the second reason social entrepreneurs are
interested in hybrid forms-expanding their access to a range of
funding streams. Founders or operators of social enterprises can opt
to form their entities as traditional nonprofit corporations or as one
of various for-profit organizational forms. Yet, any of these choices
will limit the funding streams available to their enterprises.
Due to the nondistribution constraint, equity capital will not be
available to social enterprises formed as nonprofits, but they can
obtain capital through donations, income earned on investments, or
sales of goods and services, and borrowing. To attract donations, a
social enterprise will want to qualify as tax-exempt and eligible to
receive tax-deductible contributions. Preserving this eligibility,
though, may significantly curtail a social entrepreneur's activities.
Tax law imposes limitations on commercial activity, affiliations with
other for-profit entities, and even some compensation plans, as well
as lobbying and campaign activity.134 Earned income is, of course,
134. See Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L.
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another source of revenue. Although some of this income will
qualify as tax-exempt, 135 for social enterprises just starting out,
investment gains are unlikely to be large and revenue from sales of
goods and services may be of a size uncertain even to fund current
activities, let alone build capital. For startup social enterprises,
investment gains are also unlikely to be large.
Finally, a social enterprise formed as a nonprofit might look to
borrowing as a potential funding source. Nonprofit corporations
may borrow from willing lenders, as could any other legally
recognized organization.13 6  Practical obstacles can figure
prominently here, however, as banks and other lenders may be less
willing to lend to nonprofits13 7 or require more onerous terms from
them due to an accurate or mistaken impression of the
organization's financial risk or its lack of an equity cushion. If social
enterprise founders or operators view donations, income earned on
investments and sales of goods and services (whether subject to full
or partial taxation or not), investment income, and borrowing as
providing insufficient funding, then hybrid forms permitting equity
financing become attractive.
Organizing as a traditional for-profit entity will give social
entrepreneurs access to equity and debt, in addition to earned
income (though it will be subject to taxation). A social enterprise
organized as a for-profit may sell shares or memberships, privately
or publicly, and may seek equity-investing partners or bank or other
lenders. As in any small for-profit, it may be difficult for a social
entrepreneur to convince arms-length investors to take equity
positions, and it may be hard to obtain loans without offering
personal guarantees or collateral. Using traditional business forms
may avoid some concerns among investors or lenders about the
incentives of the entity and its leaders to succeed financially and to
repay its debts. Yet, for diligent investors or lenders who closely
examine the business plan of a social entrepreneur, the mix of social
and profit purposes may raise eyebrows and interest rates.
A social enterprise organized as a for-profit will also have
REV. 2437, 2454-55 (2009) (describing some of these limitations).
135. Tax-exempt organizations are exempt from tax on income from sales of
goods and services only to the extent it is not deemed unrelated business
income, defined as income from a trade or business that is "regularly carried
on." I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (2010). "[T]he conduct of which is not substantially
related. . . to the exercise or performance" of exempt functions." § 513(a).
136. Only quite large and sophisticated nonprofit social enterprises will be
able to access private debt markets through qualified tax-favored bond
offerings. These bond offerings are regulated through I.R.C. sections 103, 141-
150, and accompanying regulations. See generally IRS, Tax-Exempt Bonds for
501(c)(3) Charitable Organizations.: Compliance Guide (2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4077.pdf.
137. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations from Corporate Income, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 72-73 (1981).
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limited access to donated funds. Adopting a traditional business
form bars tax-exemption and eligibility for deductible contributions,
despite calls by some for a change in this position. 138 This is so
regardless of whether an entity pursues social purposes or
charitable activity. Of course, forming as a for-profit will not
necessarily preclude all socially-motivated sources of revenue.
Cause-related marketing 39 campaigns like the various "pink"
product sales for breast cancer awareneSS140 and the RED campaign
to combat AIDS in Africal41 have raised millions of dollars through
sales by purely for-profit corporations. If a for-profit social
enterprise can convince consumers or investors that it will use some
of their dollars for good, they too may be able to attract the funds of
those with mixed social and financial motivations. If hybrid forms
can ease access to donations and other socially-motivated funding
sources, social entrepreneurs will prefer them to traditional for-
profit forms.
The benefit corporation statutes do not speak expressly to the
question of financing, but adopters of this form would certainly be
ineligible to receive deductible contributions. Rater, benefit
corporations can pursue the funding sources available to traditional
for-profits. In this pursuit, the dual mission embedded in the form
may or may not prove advantageous. The benefit corporation form
seems likely to draw potential investors and lenders' attention to the
dual mission of the organization. On the one hand, this may make
those motivated purely by profit even more hesitant to invest or lend
to a benefit corporation than to a for-profit social enterprise. On the
other hand, it may attract potential investors or lenders who are
interested in combining their financial contributions with a
purchase of social good. Socially-motivated investors may be more
willing to risk lower financial returns from a firm credibly
committed to simultaneously pursuing profit and social good. While
they might distrust the bona fides of a pure for-profit social
enterprise, a benefit corporation statutorily committed to pursue
public benefit could be more attractive.
138. See, e.g., DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: How RESTRAINTS ON
NONPROFITS UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL 35-37 (2008); Anup Malani & Eric A.
Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2020-21 (2007).
139. See Terri Lynn Helge, The Taxation of Cause-Related Marketing, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883, 885--86 (2010) (explaining the cause-related marketing
concept).
140. See, e.g., Save Lids to Save Lives, YOPLAIT, http://www.yoplait.com/Slsl
/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2011) (describing the yogurt producer's
cause-related marketing campaign to benefit itself and Susan G. Komen For the
Cure).
141. See The (RED) Idea, (RED), http://www.joinred.comlaboutred (last
visited Aug. 28, 2011) (explaining the concept of selling products for which
companies have promised to donate half of their profits to the Global Fund for
HIV/AIDS).
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In fact, both results might occur. Then, the question is whether
the gain of attracting socially-motivated investors and lenders
outweighs the cost of driving off purely-profit-motivated ones. This
empirical question cannot yet be answered. Even assuming the
gains would outweigh the costs, however, the potential gains are
premised on the idea that the enforcement of dual mission is
credible. The credibility of this claim comes back to enforcement
and, as noted in Part II.A, enforcement in the benefit corporation
remains uncertain.
The indeterminate ability of the benefit corporation form to
expand funding streams is not unusual in the hybrid space. None of
the other current hybrid forms can offer tax deductions to donors.
The only one that claims the ability to attract tax-benefitted assets
is the L3C, which is designed to attract foundation funding through
program-related investments ("PRIs").142 PRIs are investments by
foundations in taxable entities motivated by the recipient's
charitable program rather than the foundation's desire to earn
income. 143 Qualifying PRIs avoid penalties on foundations for risky,
jeopardizing investments and count toward the roughly five percent
of assets foundations must distribute annually.144 Foundations may
believe a costly private letter ruling process is necessary to assure
qualification as a PRI; if the L3C smoothed that path, it would
perhaps become a preferred vehicle for foundation funding.146 As of
yet, the IRS has not offered any assurances that investments in
L3Cs qualify as PRIs on the basis of L3C form alone, and it seems
unlikely to do so in the near future.146 Thus, no current hybrid form
promises significant access to true donations, though they all share
the benefit corporation's ability to perhaps attract socially motivated
142. Frequently Asked Questions, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/faqs.php (click on
Financing) (last visited Aug. 28, 2011) ("The L3C vehicle is designed to attract
PRI investments.").
143. See I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2011).
144. See id.; Qualifying Distributions - In General, IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/foundations/article/,,id=162934,00.html (last
visited Aug. 28, 2011).
145. See Michael N. Fine & Kerrin B. Slattery, Illinois Recognizes New
Business Entity That Mixes For-Profit and Nonprofit Elements, McDERMOTT
WILL & EMERY, Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.mwe.comlindex.cfm/fuseaction
/publications.nldetaillobjectid/7e32373a-065a-4d91-a8c2-556532d769a9.cfm
("The only way to be certain of PRI treatment, currently, is for a private
foundation to seek a private ruling from the IRS. However, the private letter
ruling process consumes both time and money.").
146. See Mark Hrywna, The L3C Status: Groups Explore Structure that
Limits Liability for Program-Related Investing, THE NON-PROFIT TIMES, Sept. 1,
2009, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+L3C+status%3A+groups
+explore+structure+that+limits+liability+for.%20.%20.-a0208056187 (reporting
comments made by the IRS' Ron Schultz, who "warned against jumping on the
LC3 bandwagon too early because of unresolved tax questions").
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dollars.
Likewise, none of the other hybrids appear much more likely to
attract market-rate investors. CICs offer only capped dividends and
lock remaining assets into the community benefit stream; thus, its
investments are simply not on par with market-rate products. In
fact, the capped dividend rates were viewed as unattractive enough
to investors to necessitate a cap increase in 2010.147 The L3C is
amenable to tranched investment, which some believe will enable it
to draw investors seeking market-rate returns.148 As I have written
elsewhere, without providing governance or other guarantees to
market-rate investors, I am skeptical that they will view L3C
investment as a substitute for market-rate products.149 Further, if
guarantees were made to satisfy market-rate investors that profit
motive will control, it would undermine dual mission and the
interest of foundations and other socially-motivated investors to
contribute their funds. 50 Thus, to my mind, the L3C, like the CIC,
the B Corp, and the benefit corporation, is likely to draw in new
investment capital only from the socially-motivated category of
investors. This may be a large market and a significant benefit of
hybrid forms, but none so far makes a strong argument for reaching
the clearly larger category of market-rate investors.
C. Branding
The third reason founders and operators of social enterprises
may find a hybrid form attractive is to help them to create a
distinctive brand.11 The American Marketing Association defines a
brand as "[a] name, term, design, symbol, or any other feature that
identifies one seller's good or service as distinct from those of other
sellers."152 Social entrepreneurs wish to market their enterprises
and their products to consumers, partners, and employees as
meaningfully different from either traditional nonprofits or for-
profits and view a hybrid form as one route to accomplish this
goal.153
147. See Notices under the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community
Enterprise) Act 2004, CIC REGULATOR, http://www.first-corporate.co.uk/CIC
%20Dividend%20Cap.pdf.
148. See Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic
Construct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010).
149. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 10, at 647-48, 650-51.
150. See id. at 650-51.
151. Note that the branding issue shares much common ground with that of
how social enterprises can appeal to investors, addressed supra Part II.B.
152. Dictionary, AMERICAN MARKETING Ass'N,
http://www.marketingpower.com/layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=B; see also
Tim Calkins, The Challenge of Branding, in KELLOGG ON BRANDING 1, 8 (2005)
("Brands are sets of associations linked to a name or mark associated with a
product or service.").
153. See Kelley, supra note 1, at 361-62; see also DAVID A. AAKER, BUILDING
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Nonprofits, in essence, sell their halo. When they offer products
to consumers, affiliations to partners, and jobs to employees, they
are selling a sense of righteousness or trustworthiness, or both. For-
profits sell efficiency. They offer products of the highest quality and
lowest price, affiliations to draw in revenue, jobs that pay a market
wage, and training in efficient business operations. Social
entrepreneurs see themselves as offering something quite different.
The profit motive makes them lean, efficient, innovative. But, their
social mission keeps them virtuous and responsible. Thus, neither
traditional nonprofit nor for-profit forms send the right message.
Yet, it is difficult to convey what a social enterprise has to offer to
consumers, partners, and employees quickly and credibly. Hybrid
forms of organization are attractive to social entrepreneurs if they
can provide a brand that will distinguish their products and
enterprises.
Whether the benefit corporation form can effectively function as
such a brand, however, depends on whether it is a credible proxy for
truly dual mission entities. The benefit corporation form will work
as a brand only if it conveys relevant information to consumers,
partners, and employees, demonstrating the value they will obtain
from a relationship with the entity the brand denotes.15 4 These
claims of value, and the benefit corporation's claims of
differentiation from typical nonprofit and for-profit entities, also
must be reliable.155 Consumers, partners, and employees interested
in purchasing from, partnering with, or being employed by a dual
mission entity will look for or be swayed by brands that demonstrate
an entity can be trusted to pursue both profit and social good. This
tracks, of course, back into the problems of dual mission articulation
and enforcement addressed above.156
The process of building the benefit corporation brand is at too
early a stage to evaluate fully, though the uncertainties about
enforcement of dual mission within the form create serious obstacles
for its success. Of course, individual benefit corporations can
STRONG BRANDS 135 (1996) (explaining how an organization's brand identity is
important for "employees, retailers and others who must buy into [a company's]
goals and values and implement [its] strategies").
154. See C. Whan Park, Deborah J. MacInnis & Joseph Priester, Brand
Attachment and a Strategic Broad Exemplar, in HANDBOOK ON BRAND AND
EXPERIENCE MANAGEMENT 3, 3 (Berndt H. Schmidt & David L. Rogers, eds.
2008) (explaining the consensus in the business academic community "that
strong brand equity is contingent on a powerful relationship between the
customer and the brand").
155. See Alice M. Tybout & Brian Sternthal, Brand Positioning, in KELLOGG
ON BRANDING 11, 12-13 (2005) (explaining that a brand's positioning must
include "reasons to believe" and arguing these reasons are "more important
when the claims are relatively abstract," like those of a social enterprise will
be).
156. See supra Part II.A.
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certainly provide greater assurances of their dual mission bona
fides, through shareholder agreements or other precommitment
devices. By doing so, these individual benefit corporations may
themselves become powerful brands. However, for the benefit
corporation form of organization itself to function as a brand, it
must convey this salient information on its own.
Finally, brands are weak unless and until they become familiar
to their target audience. 57 Even if an organizational form could
reliably convey commitment and follow-through on dual mission, it
can function as a strong brand only when enough entities adopt it
and the brand's meaning becomes known in the marketplace.
Standard-setters clearly have a stake in disseminating information
about the benefit corporation brand and encouraging social
enterprises to adopt it. This need to generate adoptions seems,
indeed, to explain B Lab's involvement in pursuing benefit
corporation legislation in the various states. Thus far, there has
been some publicity about benefit corporations, but few entities have
adopted the form and little is known about how its future adopters
will behave.
As is the case with expanding access to capital, other hybrid
forms also face challenges similar to those of the benefit corporation
in their drive to become effective brands. First, each form will need
to prove an effective proxy for entities with clearly articulated and
reliably enforced dual missions, issues addressed above.15 8 Second,
each form will need to be adopted widely enough to spread
knowledge of the brand to potential customers, partners, and
employees. This job is already underway for each developing hybrid
form. B Lab, of course, has a strong interest in creating awareness
of the B Corp form and is actively pursuing this goal.159 Americans
for Community Development is a "professional organization
comprised of the individuals and organizations participating in the
movement to create L3Cs," 60 which has been heavily involved in
spreading the word about the L3C to legislatures and the public.161
157. Cf. AAKER, supra note 153, at 307 (explaining that for a consumer
brand to be powerful, consumers must be aware of the brand and understand
what it represents, and noting such brand knowledge is "not simply built by
exposures; rather it is generated by a real customer intimacy with the brand").
158. See id.
159. See B LAB, 2011 Annual Report, supra note 55, at 16-17.
160. Karen Woods, Welcome to the New Americans for Community
Development, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/index.php (last visited
Aug. 28, 2011).
161. See Considering Legislation in Your State?, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/considering
.php (last visited Aug. 30, 2011); PR of L3Cs, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/prforl3cs
.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
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In the United Kingdom, the CIC regulator has taken a role in
informing the public about the CIC.162 Each of these entities is
pursuing a solid brand for its favored form; yet, the growing number
and diversity of legal forms for social enterprise may lead to some
confusion in the marketplace.
D. Sustainability
Finally, social entrepreneurs may also see a hybrid form as
providing their enterprises with greater sustainability than
traditional nonprofit or for-profit forms can offer. 63 Of course,
sustainability can mean many different things. When thinking
about sustainable development, the UN Brundtland commission
defined it as "meeting the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs."16 4 When researching sustainable corporations, one quickly
runs across ideas like the triple bottom line (economic, social, and
environmental outcomes) or the 3-P model (People, Profit, Planet).165
These ideas clearly resonate with the fundamental ideas of a social
enterprise, melding pursuit of profits with social good, often
including environmental goals. But, the benefit corporation form is
not there yet. This new hybrid form must allow social enterprises to
articulate and enforce dual missions, to obtain greater access to
capital, and to brand themselves to consumers and partners as
distinct and special entities offering distinct and special products, in
order to truly embody the sustainable corporation.
CONCLUSION
The benefit corporation will not yet achieve all of the goals
social enterprises desire from a hybrid form. Benefit corporation
statutes have opened up a place for social enterprises to legally
articulate their dual mission, and have guarded the ultimate exit
from the hybrid form with significant shareholder voting
requirements. Leaving all content to unregulated standard-setters
and providing little guidance or enforcement apparatus for
midstream decision making, however, does not do enough to ensure
benefit corporations can enforce a dual mission over time.
Thoughtful founders and leaders of social enterprises considering
162. See About Us, supra note 114.
163. Intriguingly, Hawaii calls its benefit corporation type entity a
"sustainable business corporation." S.B. 298, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. § 2 (Haw.
2011).
164. UNITED NATIONS, G.A. Res. 42/187, Report of the World Commission on
Environment and Development, available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga
/res/42/ares42-187.htm.
165. See JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE
OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS 20 (1998); PETER FISK, PEOPLE PLANET PROFIT: How
To EMBRACE SUSTAINABILITY FOR INNOVATION AND BUSINEss GROWTH 3 (2010).
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the benefit corporation form will consider whether investors,
consumers, partners, and employees will find this balance and
brand appealing. Until a hybrid form is created that clearly and
powerfully enforces dual mission, though, I believe access to
expanded capital, effective branding, and sustainability will remain
elusive.

